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 On July 2, 2021, 55-year-old 
To r o n t o Po l i c e S e r v i c e 
Constable Jeffrey Northrup 
was killed while responding 
to a call in the very early 
hours. 
Constable Northrup and his 
partner were  conducting an 
investigation in response to a call in an 
underground parking lot. During the course of 
this event, Constable Northrup was struck by a 
vehicle in what is believed to be  an 
intentional, deliberate  act. He was attended to 
by other first responders, rushed to hospital 
and pronounced dead shortly after. A male 
suspect has been charged with first degree 
murder.
Constable Northrup proudly served the Toronto 
Police Service for 31 and a half years. He 
started his career with Court Services, was 
assigned to 11 Division when he became a 
police officer in 1999, and had been a 
member of 52 Division since 2008. He was 
also a proud member of the Chief’s 
Ceremonial Unit. 
Constable Northrup is survived by his wife, 
three children and his mother.
“[A] man who dedicated his life to the things that 
matter most – his community and his family.”
Toronto Police Service Chief James Ramer
~ Constable Jeffrey Northrup ~
IN SERVICE: 10-8
Volume 21 Issue 4~July/August 2021
PAGE 2
National Library of Canada 
Cataloguing in Publication 
Data
Main entry under title:
In service: 10-8. -- Vol. 1, no. 1 (June 2001)  
  Monthly
  Title from caption.
  “A newsletter devoted to operational police 
officers across British Columbia.”
       ISSN 1705-5717 = In service, 10-8
1. Police - British Columbia - Periodicals. 2. 
Police - Legal status, laws, etc. - Canada - 
Cases - Periodicals. I. Justice Institute of 
British Columbia. Police Academy. II. Title: In 
service, 10-8. III. Title: In service, ten-eight.
Highlights In This Issue
Bachelor Of Law Enforcement Studies 4
Matching Description To Police Bulletin Justified 
Detention
7
‘Holding’ Cell Phone Not Limited To Using One’s 
Hands
9
Cops Top Judges, Lawyers & Lawmakers For Respect 12
Canadian Police & Peace Officer Memorial Service 13
2020 Police Reported Crime 19
Alberta Jordan Applications 23
National DNA Data Bank 24
Success Rate Of Appeals Rise In BC’s Highest Court 25
Evidence Of Prior Uncharged Criminal Activity OK 
in ITO
27
Assault PO Forms Unlawful Act Of Unlawfully 
Causing Bodily Harm
29
‘Motor Assisted Cycle’: Motor Must Be Capable Of 
Supplementing Human Propulsion
31
Unless otherwise noted all articles are authored by 
Mike  Novakowski, MA, LLM. The articles contained 
herein are provided for information purposes only 
and are not to be construed as legal or other 
professional advice. The opinions expressed herein 
are not necessarily  the opinions of the Justice 
Institute of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to this 
newsletter.   
Law Enforcement Studies Diploma
Be the one making a difference  and keeping 
communities safe. If you want to gain the applied 
skills to be a sought-after graduate pursuing a 
rewarding career in law enforcement and public 
safety, then this program is for you.
Click Here
Law Enforcement Studies Degree
If you have a relevant diploma, and are interested in 
obtaining an applied degree to pursue a law 
enforcement or public  safety career, then this 
program is for you. This program builds on previous 
relevant studies with an applied degree, and is 
designed to increase your chances of success.
Click Here
Post-Baccalaureate Diploma in 
Disaster Management
Be the one in a dynamic and growing field keeping 
communities safe. If you have a bachelor's degree 
and are interested in pursuing and advancing your 
career in the fields of disaster and emergency 
management, this program is for you.
Click Here
Certificate in Emergency 
Management
Be the one advancing  your career. If you are 
interested in a career in emergency management, 
currently work as an emergency manager, or are a 
first responder or public safety  professional looking 
to move into an emergency management role, this 
program is for you.
Click Here
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Big data surveillance and security intelligence: 
the Canadian case.
edited by David Lyon & David Murakami Wood.
Vancouver, BC; Toronto, ON: UBC Press, 2021.
JL 86 I58 B54 2021
Also available in eBook format (JIBC login required)
The Canadian justice system: an overview.
Paul Atkinson & Daniel Atkinson.
Markham, ON: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2020.
KE 444 A85 2020
Creating effective teams: a guide for members 
and leaders.
Susan A. Wheelan, Maria Åkerlund & Christian 
Jacobsson.
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc, 2021.
HD 66 W485 2021
Effective interviewing and interrogation 
techniques.
Nathan J. Gordon & William L. Fleisher.
London; San Diego, CA: Academic Press, an imprint 
of Elsevier, 2019.
HV 8073 G64 2019
Effective treatments for PTSD: practice guidelines 
from the International Society for Traumatic 
Stress Studies.
edited by  David Forbes, Jonathan I. Bisson, Candice 
M. Monson & Lucy Berliner.
New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 2020.
RC 552 P67 E35 2020
Also available in eBook format (JIBC login required)
Mastering facilitation: a guide for assisting teams 
and achieving great outcomes.
Morgan L. Jones.
Boca Raton, FL: Routledge, 2021.
HM 751 J66 2021
Mistakes were made (but not by me): why we 
justify foolish beliefs, bad decisions, and hurtful 
acts.
Carol Tavris & Elliot Aronson.
Boston, MA: Mariner Books, Houghton Mifflin 
Harcourt, 2020.
BF 337 C63 T38 2020
Neuroscience for organizational change: an 
evidence-based practical guide to managing 
change.
 Hilary Scarlett.
New York, NY: Kogan Page Ltd, 2019.
HD 58.8 S294 2019
Stop avoiding stuff: 25 microskills to face your 
fears & do it anyway.
Matthew S. Boone, Jennifer Gregg, & Lisa W. Coyne.
Oakland, CA: New Harbinger Publications, 2020.
BF 575 F2 B66 2020
Sudden death: intervention skills for the 
emergency services.
edited by Tricia Scott.
Cham: Springer, 2020.
RB 150 S84 S84 2020
Also available in eBook format (JIBC login required)
Violence against children in the criminal justice 
system: global perspectives on prevention.
edited by Wendy O'Brien and Cédric Foussard.
New York, NY: Routledge, 2020.
Available in eBook format only (JIBC login required)
What's wrong with leadership?: improving 
leadership research and practice
edited by Ronald E. Riggio.
New York, NY: Routledge, 2019.
HD 57.7 W456 2019
Also available in eBook format (JIBC login required)
BACHELOR OF LAW 
ENFORCEMENT STUDIES (BLES) 
 Get Ahead of the Competition
Today’s law enforcement and public safety environment is complex. Employees in public and private 
organizations are increasingly being called upon to perform inspections, investigations, security 
supervision, enforcement and regulatory compliance functions. The Bachelor of Law Enforcement 
Studies (BLES) provides expanded opportunities in the study of law enforcement and public safety 
and will position you to be a sought-after candidate in a highly competitive recruiting environment. Our 
education program will prepare you for success by developing your leadership skills, and enhancing your 
interpersonal communications, critical thinking and ethical decision making.




WHO SHOULD TAKE THIS PROGRAM
• Graduates of JIBC’s two-year Law Enforcement 
Studies Diploma (LESD) or applicants a diploma 
or associate degree in a related field can 
begin in the third year of the Bachelor of Law 
Enforcement Studies program. 
• Applicants who have completed a peace officer 
training program with a minimum of three years 
full-time service in a recognized public safety 
agency with a Prior Learning Assessment 
that would allow for 60 credits to be granted 
towards completion of the degree program.
• police officer
• conservation officer 
• animal cruelty officer
• border services agency 
official 
• fraud investigator
• by-law enforcement officer 
• regulatory enforcement 
officer
• gaming investigator 
• correctional officer 
• deputy sheriff 
• intelligence services officer
• probation officer
CAREER FLEXIBILITY
The program will provide you with the in-depth knowledge, expanded skills and competencies to seek 
employment in a wide range of law enforcement, public safety, regulatory, and compliance fields offering 
you more career flexibility and professional development. Examples of potential roles include:
WHAT WILL I LEARN?
This comprehensive program will prepare you to contribute to a just and fair society as a member within a 
variety of criminal justice and public safety professions. Graduates will obtain:
• An in-depth knowledge of the Canadian criminal justice system. 
• Analysis and reasoning skills informed by theory and research.
• Skills required to effectively work within a law enforcement agency. 
BACHELOR OF LAW ENFORCEMENT STUDIES (BLES) 
CURRICULUM AT A GLANCE
Courses in years one and two are offered through the Law Enforcement Studies Diploma. Years 
three and four build on these courses to complete the degree. Students can pursue their third 
and fourth year studies full-time or part-time to complete the final 60 credits. 
Year 3
• Criminal & Deviant Behaviour
• Comparative Criminal Justice
• Leadership in a Law Enforcement Environment
• Search & Seizure Law in Canada
• Organizational Behaviour
• Investigations & Forensic Evidence
• Restorative Justice
• Project Management
• Data & Research Management
Year 4
• Aboriginal People and Policy
• Multiculturalism, Conflict and Social Justice
• Administrative and Labour Law in Canada
• Applied Research in Public Safety and Law
Enforcement
• Professional Practice in Justice and Public Safety
• Crisis Intervention
• Research Project
• Governance and Accountability in Law
Enforcement
• Terrorism and Society
• Organized Crime and Society
PROGRAM FORMAT
Students can pursue their studies full-time at the New Westminster campus or online. The full-
time on-campus format consists of 60 credits completed over two years with courses over the 
fall and winter semesters (five courses per semester). The online format consists of 60 credits 
that must be completed within five years with the flexibility to take courses in the fall, winter 
and spring-summer semesters.
HOW TO APPLY?
Credit for the first two years of BLES will be granted to students who meet the program’s 
admission requirements. For details on admission requirements and application deadlines 
please visit our website at jibc.ca/bles.
715 McBride Boulevard 
New Westminster, BC V3L 5T4 
Canada
Justice Institute of British 
Columbia (JIBC) is Canada’s 
leading public safety educator 
recognized nationally and 
internationally for innovative 







  JIBC: Justice Institute of British Columbia
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JUDGE ENJOYS ABSOLUTE 
IMMUNITY FROM CIVIL 
LIABILITY WHILE ACTING IN 
OFFICIAL CAPACITY





against a bank 
and its lawyer. 
In his action against the bank 
he sought general damages 
in the amount of $100 
million and punitive and 
exemplary damages in the  amount of $246 
billion. He also claimed an additional $1 million in 
general, punitive and exemplary damages in his 
action against the bank’s lawyer. When the matters 
came before the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
of Prince Edward Island, she dismissed the actions 
on the basis that they were frivolous, vexatious or 
otherwise  an abuse of process.  The plaintiff then 
sued the Chief Justice who dismissed his claim 
seeking punitive and exemplary damages in the 
amount of $1 million.
Prince Edward Island Supreme Court
The claim against the Chief Justice was 
dismissed in its entirety as being 
frivolous, vexatious and/or an abuse  of 
process.  The motions judge found  no 
reasonable cause of action was disclosed anywhere 
in the entire statement of claim and, on its face, the 
plaintiff’s claim was without merit or substance.  
Further, dissatisfaction with a judicial decision 
taken in good faith did not constitute grounds for 
an action against the decision-making judge and, 
therefore, the proceeding was an abuse of process. 
Prince Edward Island Court of Appeal
The plaintiff challenged the 
dismissal of his claim. But the 
lower court’s ruling was upheld 
because  (1) the Chief Justice 
was immune from civil suit and (2) the plaintiff’s 
action was “frivolous and vexatious” and “entirely 
devoid of merit”.
Judicial Immunity
“The immunity of judges from civil liability  for acts 
done in the performance of their judicial functions 
is an ancient and well-established principle of law 
inherited from the English Common law,” said 
Justice Mitchell for the Court of Appeal. He 
continued:
The principle of judicial immunity is not a perk 
for judges. Rather it is an essential element of 
the independence of the judiciary. An 
independent judiciary is the right of every 
Canadian and constitutes a fundamental pillar 
of the rule of law in a free and democratic 
society.
A judge must be, and must be seen to be, free 
to decide honestly and impartially on the basis 
of the law without external pressure or 
influence and without fear of reprisal of 
litigation by those who might feel wronged by 
their decision.
Should a litigant feel that a judge has erred in 
law, a litigant is free to appeal the decision to a 
higher court.  Should the litigant feel the 
Supreme Court judge engaged in inappropriate 
conduct or comments, the litigant may file a 
complaint with the Canadian Judicial Council.  
A litigant cannot, however, sue a judge as 
superior court judges have absolute immunity 
from civil liability for acts done in their 
capacity as judges.  Provincial Court judges 
“The principle of judicial immunity is not a perk for judges. Rather it is an 
essential element of the independence of the judiciary. An independent judiciary 
is the right of every Canadian and constitutes a fundamental pillar of the rule of 
law in a free and democratic society.”
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have the same immunity by virtue of s.11(2) of 
the Provincial Court Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, Cap. 
P-25. [references omitted, paras. 9-11]
Frivolous & Vexatious
In agreeing that the action was frivolous and 
vexatious, and entirely devoid of merit, Justice 
Mitchell stated:
The focus of the proceeding is acknowledgment 
and correction of a perceived government 
shortcoming as opposed to any rights 
recognized by law.  There are no stated legal or 
evidentiary grounds upon which to entertain or 
allow the appeal. There is nothing in the 
[plaintiff’s] notice of appeal or submissions that 
points to any legal error made by the Rule 2.1 
motions judge. Hence, the matter is frivolous.  
The claim contains entirely unfounded and 
unwarranted inappropriate and scandalous 
allegations and aspersions regarding the person 
of the defendant judge. There is nothing on the 
face of the proceeding or in the appeal record 
to support [the plaintiff’] various bare 
allegations of bad faith made outside the 
defendant judge’s jurisdiction.  Hence the 
matter is vexatious.   In these circumstances, it 
was appropriate for the motions judge to find, 
as he did, that the proceeding was frivolous, 
vexatious, and an abuse of process. [para. 12]
The plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s Note: Additional facts taken from Taha v. 
Clements, 2019 PESC 23
MATCHING DESCRIPTION TO 
POLICE BULLETIN JUSTIFIED 
DETENTION
R. v. Linklater, 2021 MBCA 65              
At about 3:34 a.m., paramedics 
responded to a neighbour’s 911 call 
about a fire at a residence.  On 
arrival, firefighters found heavy 
smoke inside but no active fire.  A 
man’s body was also found slumped in a 
chair. There was blood on the body, the floor and 
the chair. No one else was in the residence.
An autopsy determined that the victim died prior to 
the fire  as a result of significant blood loss due to 
his injuries, which included 33 sharp-force wounds 
to his face, back and arms (slashes or stabs caused 
by a knife). As part of their investigation, police 
located surveillance videos of the victim prior to his 
death from various locations. These videos showed 
the victim with a man and a woman at a hotel 
approximately  two to three  hours prior to the 911 
call.  The surveillance videos also showed these 
same two individuals in the vicinity of the victim’s 
residence after the 911 call. 
In an effort to identify the people in the surveillance 
videos, the  police issued three bulletins.  The 
bulletins included a brief description of the man 
and the woman and photographs taken from the 
surveillance videos.  One of the bulletins also 
included a video clip from taken the surveillance 
videos. 
A few days later, two police officers who had seen 
the bulletins and attended shift briefings where the 
bulletins were discussed, recognized the accused 
walking down the street with the woman. They 
were immediately detained as persons of interest 
for a “murder investigation”.  They were  provided 
with their s. 10(b) Charter rights and given the 
police caution. The accused was placed in the back 
of a police car and back-up was requested to assist 
with the woman. 
“A judge must be, and must be 
seen to be, free to decide 
honestly and impartially on the 
basis of the law without 
external pressure or influence 
and without fear of reprisal of 
litigation by those who might 
feel wronged by their decision.”
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While the accused was detained, the police 
obtained his name, date of birth and address. A 
supervisor attended and contacted the homicide 
supervisor who instructed the officers to arrest the 
accused and his female companion. The arrest for 
second degree murder occurred 25-minutes after 
the initial detention. Using the address the  accused 
provided, the police obtained a search warrant for 
his residence where they discovered and seized 
evidence, including a plaid shirt and a  baseball 
cap. The accused, along with the woman, were 
jointly charged with second degree murder.  
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
Among other things, the accused argued 
that his address, the plaid shirt and the 
baseball cap were obtained in violation 
of his ss. 8, 9, 10(a) and 10(b) Charter 
rights. He contended the police obtained his 
address during an unlawful detention and in 
response to questions asked before he had the 
opportunity to speak to a lawyer. He then 
submitted that the search warrant would not have 
issued  without his address and, without the search 
warrant, the seizure of the  plaid shirt and baseball 
cap were unlawful. 
The judge concluded that the accused’s detention 
and arrest were lawful and therefore did not breach 
s. 9 (arbitrary detention). He also found no 
breaches of s. 8 (search or seizure), nor of s. 10(a) 
(to be informed promptly  of the reason for arrest or 
detention) or s. 10(b) (right to counsel).The accused 
was subsequently  convicted by a jury of second 
degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment 
with a 12-year period of parole ineligibility. His co-
accused, on the other hand,  was acquitted. 
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The accused argued, in part, 
that the trial judge improperly 
applied the law to the facts in 
finding that his detention and 
arrest were not arbitrary and, therefore, compliant 
with s. 9 of the Charter. He submitted that the 
police did not have the necessary grounds to detain 
or arrest him, and it was unlawful for the  police to 
detain him with the intention of ascertaining his 
identity. 
Investigative Detention
Justice leMaistre, delivering the opinion of the 
Court of Appeal, noted Supreme Court of Canada 
jurisprudence holding that the police have the 
power to “detain an individual for investigative 
purposes where, in the  totality of circumstances, 
there are reasonable grounds to suspect a  clear 
nexus between the individual and a recent or still 
unfolding crime.”  In upholding the trial judge’s 
finding that the police acted lawfully, she stated:
... The trial judge carefully reviewed the 
information known to the officers when they 
recognized the accused from the bulletins and 
briefings, as well as their personal observations 
and reasons for detaining him.  He also 
considered whether the officers’ suspicions that 
the accused was one of the individuals sought 
in connection with the murder investigation 
were objectively reasonable.  The trial judge 
concluded that the officers had “more than a 
reasonable suspicion that [the accused and the 
woman] matched the information which had 
been given to them in the bulletins and at 
police briefings” and that “their detention of 
them was fully justified.”  
In my view, the detention prior to the accused’s 
arrest was justified in the context of an 
investigation into a recent murder and the 
accused’s resemblance to a person of interest in 
the investigation. The police were investigating 
a serious offence.  The bulletins and briefings 
were clear that the police were attempting to 
identify the male and female who were with 
the victim in the surveillance videos and that 
they were “persons of interest in relation to the 
murder”. Anyone with information about the 
“[T]he detention prior to the accused’s arrest was justified in the context of an 
investigation into a recent murder and the accused’s resemblance to a person of 
interest in the investigation.” 
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“persons of interest” was to notify the homicide 
unit. 
As a result of the bulletins and briefings, two 
police officers recognized these “persons of 
interest” as they were walking down the street.  
The officers detained them on site for a 
relatively short duration until they determined 
that there were grounds for an arrest.  This is 
how police investigations are done. There was 
nothing unusual let alone inappropriate or 
unjustified with the detention and arrest.  There 
is no merit to the accused’s argument that the 
police did not have the necessary grounds to 
detain or arrest him. 
The accused’s address used by police in their 
information to obtain the search warrant was 
provided by the accused after he was lawfully 
detained, but before he was arrested.  In this 
scenario, I fail to see the relevance of the 
lawfulness of the arrest to the admissibility of 
the items seized pursuant to the search warrant. 
[paras. 26-29]
Since the detention was lawful, there was no need 
to conduct a s. 24(2) Charter analysis.
The accused’s appeal against his conviction was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
‘HOLDING’ CELL PHONE NOT 
LIMITED TO USING ONE’S 
HANDS
R. v. Rajani, 2021 BCCA 292
A police officer saw the accused 
looking down while driving. The 
officer approached the car and saw a 
cell phone connected to a cord face-
up in the accused’s lap. The officer 
could see  a glassy surface but could not say 
whether the cell phone was lit. The officer issued 
the accused a violation ticket for using an 
electronic device while driving, contrary to s. 
214.2(1) of BC’s Motor Vehicle Act (MVA). 
British Columbia Provincial Court
The accused disputed the ticket before a 
Judicial Justice. The accused agreed he 
had been looking down when the 
officer first saw him, but testified that 
the cell phone was wedged between his right thigh 
and the car seat, facing up. 
The Judicial Justice upheld the ticket. In his view, 
the precise location of the cell phone made no 
difference since the phone was a potential 
distraction and was in use because it was being 
charged. 
British Columbia Supreme Court
The accused argued the Judicial Justice 
erred in his ruling. The Crown conceded 
that the Judicial Justice’s interpretation 
of the MVA was in error when he  found 
it prohibited (1) the touch-free charging of a cell 
phone in a vehicle  and (2) the presence of an 
electronic device anywhere in a vehicle because it 
could possibly be distracting. In this case, however, 
the accused was “holding” the phone in a position 
in which it could be used. In the appeal judge’s 
view, the phone was being supported in a way that 
permitted its use and she rejected the accused’s 
suggestion that “holding” was restricted to an 
action done with one’s hands. Regardless of 
whether the accused had the cell phone on his lap 
or wedged between his thigh and the  seat, with the 
screen facing up, he was holding it in a position in 
which it could be used.  
“To interpret ‘holding’ as being restricted to an 
action done with one’s hands is not in harmony 
with the scheme of the  distracted driving 
provisions of the MVA,”  said the appeal judge. 
“Such an interpretation would allow drivers to 
operate their vehicles with electronic devices in 
their laps, between their thighs, tucked under their 
arms or chins, or supported by other parts of their 
bodies.” The curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of 
the Criminal Code was applied and the accused’s 
conviction was upheld. 
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British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused contended that 
the prohibition in s.  214.2(1) 
of the MVA did not apply to a 
cell phone wedged between a 
driver’s leg and the seat when the screen was not 
illuminated. In his view, the “ordinary meaning” of 
the words “use” and “hold”, as well as the 
description of the bill when it was introduced in the 
Legislature, did not render his conduct unlawful. 
“Holding”
Section 214.2(1) of the MVA prohibits using an 
electric device while driving. “Use” includes 
“holding the device in a position in which it may 
be used”. Justice Fenlon, writing the Court of 
Appeal decision, concluded “holding” was not 
restricted to using one’s hands:
“Holding” in s.  214.1(a) means physically 
grasping, carrying, or supporting an electronic 
device with any part of one’s body in a position 
in which the device may be used. [para. 15]
In coming to this conclusion, Justice Fenton noted 
(1) “the  definition of ‘electronic device’ in s. 214.1 
includes a large number of devices, not only 
handheld devices but also global positioning 
sys tems and te lev i s ions” ; (2) a “broad 
interpretation of ‘holding’ best aligns with the 
Legislature’s object of preventing death and 
injuries associated with distracted driving because 
it captures more potentially distracting conduct 
than the narrow interpretation urged by the 
[accused]”; and (3) a “broader interpretation 
accords with the ordinary grammatical meaning of 
‘hold.’”  (The Oxford English, Merriam-Webster and 
Cambridge dictionaries were cited).
In this case, the accused was holding the phone by 
physically supporting it with a part of his body in a 
position in which it could be used. The curative 
proviso applied and the accused’s appeal was 
dismissed.
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
BY THE BOOK:
BC’s Motor Vehicle Act
Definitions
214.1  In this Part:
"electronic device" means
(a) a hand-held cellular telephone or another 
hand-held electronic device that includes a telephone 
function,
(b) a hand-held electronic device that is capable of 
transmitting or receiving electronic mail or other text-
based messages, or
(c) a prescribed class or type of electronic device;
"use", in relation to an electronic device, means one or more 
of the following actions:
(a) holding the device in a position in which it may be 
used;
(b) operating one or more of the device's functions;
(c) communicating orally by means of the device with 
another person or another device;
(d) taking another action that is set out in the 
regulations by means of, with or in relation to an 
electronic device.
Prohibition against use of electronic 
device while driving
s.  214.2 (1) A person must not use an electronic device 
while driving or operating a motor vehicle on a highway.
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), a person must not 
communicate by means of an electronic device with another 
person or another device by electronic mail or other text-
based message.
“‘Holding’ in s. 214.1(a) means physically grasping, carrying, or supporting an 
electronic device with any part of one’s body in a position in which the device 
may be used.”
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“To interpret ‘holding’ as being restricted to an 
action done with one’s hands is not in harmony 
with the scheme of the distracted driving 
provisions of the MVA. Such an interpretation 
would allow drivers to operate their vehicles 
with electronic devices in their laps, between 
their thighs, tucked under their arms or chins, 
or supported by other parts of their bodies.”
R. v. Rajani, 2020 BCSC 779 at para. 27, appeal dismissed 2021 BCCA 292.
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COPS TOP JUDGES, LAWYERS & 
LAWMAKERS FOR RESPECT
In a recent Maru Public Opinion survey — 
“Canada’s Most Respected Occupations 2021” — it 
was revealed that Canadians have more respect for 
the police than they do for judges, lawyers or 
lawmakers (elected Members of Parliament). While 
37% of the Canadian public  said they respected 
the police very much, only 27%  said they had such 
respect for judges followed by lawyers at 12% and 
elected Members of Parliament at 9%. 
The survey also reported the percentage of 
respondents who did not respect these occupations 
at all. 
Most Respected Occupations
Of the 28 occupations identified in the survey, 
Firefighters were found to be the most respected 
occupation with a weighted Respect Score of 92.5 
while Owners of Social Media Platforms were 
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CANADIAN POLICE & 
PEACE OFFICER 
MEMORIAL SERVICE
Sunday, September 26, 2021 
Parliament Hill
Ottawa, Ontario
BC LAW ENFORCEMENT 
MEMORIAL SERVICE 
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BC IIO NOTIFICATIONS UP 
FROM THE PREVIOUS YEAR
In its Annual Report 2020-2021, the IIO described 
itself as follows:
The IIO is a civilian-led oversight law 
enforcement agency which was created in 
2012. It is headed by the Chief Civilian 
Director (CCD) who, per the Police Act, is not 
permitted to have ever been a police officer. 
The IIO is mandated to conduct investigations 
into incidents involving death or serious harm 
that may have been the result of the actions or 
inactions of a police officer, whether on- or off- 
duty. 
The IIO’s jurisdiction extends to all police 
officers operating in B.C. This includes 11 
municipal agencies, the Royal Mounted 
Canadian Police (RCMP), the South Coast BC 
Transportation Authority Police Service (Metro 
Vancouver Transit Police), and the Stl’atl’imx 
Tribal Police Service. In addition, officers 
appointed as special provincial constables and 
municipal constables are also subject to 
oversight by the IIO. The IIO does not have 
jurisdiction over correctional officers in 
municipal, provincial, or federal correctional 
facilities, or civilian jail guards. 
... An IIO investigation occurs whenever it is 
determined that there has been serious harm or 
death; no allegations of wrongdoing on the part 
of the involved officers is required. All 
investigations are completed in as transparent a 
manner as practicable under the circumstances, 
while respect ing the integr i ty of the 
investigation and the privacy interests of those 
involved. The IIO conducts all investigations to 
a criminal law standard. 
According to its Annual Report, the IIO received 
339 incident notifications that potentially involved 
serious harm or death arising from the action or 
inaction of police for the fiscal period from April 1, 
2020 to March 31, 2021. Of these 339 
notifications, 106 were categorized as advice files 
while 232 were investigated. During the 
2020-2021 fiscal year, 104 cases were concluded: 
53  cases were closed with a public report and 44 
cases were concluded with a media release. Eight 
(8) cases were referred to Crown Counsel while 52 
cases remained under active investigation. 
Of the 232 investigations opened:
• 169 originated from an RCMP detachment, 61 
from a municipal police agency, two (2) from 
the Metro Vancouver Transit Police and one (1) 
involved a Health Authority Special Constable.
• 172 notifications to the  IIO occurred within 24 
hours of the  incident taking place. Of these 
notifications, 32 were made within one hour of 
the incident. The remaining 60  notifications 
occurred after 24 hours. 
AFFECTED PERSONS 










































Male 0 0 5 13 25 29 32 23 15 21 12 8 6 2 2 0 0 0 0 193
Female 1 0 4 4 4 9 4 6 1 3 0 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 42
Total 1 0 9 17 29 38 36 29 16 24 12 10 6 4 3 0 0 0 1 235
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“Serious harm” is defined “as injury that may 
result in death, may cause serious disfigurement, or 
may cause substantial loss or impairment of 
mobility of the body as a whole or of the function 
of any limb or organ.” 
The “medical” classification “includes instances 
where  the primary reason for the death or serious 
harm of the affected person is attributed to a health 
condition confirmed by a medical professional 
during the course of an IIO investigation.”
The “other” classification “involve circumstances 
that are not well-aligned with the broader 
classification groups identified or may include 
elements that fit under multiple categories.” 
The “self-inflicted” classification includes serious 
harm or death that “occur as a result of some action 
on the part of the affected person. For example, an 
individual who sustains a serious injury when they 
fell while running from police would be classified 
as self-inflicted.” In this report, “the IIO has 
eliminated the  in-custody category because being 
in custody is not a mechanism of harm, although 
serious harm and death may occur there.” The IIO 
has decided that “these  files are more appropriately 
classified by the condition which caused or 
contributed to the serious harm or death, such as 
medical, use of force, etc.”
Crown Counsel Referrals
Of the eight (8) cases referred to Crown Counsel in 
fiscal 2020-2021, charges were approved in only 
one (1) case, no charges were approved in two (2) 
cases and the remaining five (5) cases were 
pending charge assessment. 
IIO Notifications
Notifications to the  IIO were up 40% over the 
previous fiscal year, but investigations rose only 
20%.
FILES BY CLASSIFICATION
Classification Death Serious Harm Total
CEW (Conducted Energy Weapon) 0 3 3
Firearm 3 3 6
Medical 10 4 14
MVI (Motor Vehicle Incident) 5 13 18
PSD (Police Service Dog) 0 16 16
Self-Inflicted 46 30 76
Use of Force 2 61 63
Other 15 21 36



















































Metro Vancouver Transit Police 2
Health Authority 1
Total* 233
Includes one investigation into a Nova Scotia 
wrongful conviction matter.
INVESTIGATIONS BY RCMP DETACHMENT
100 Mile House 2 Nanaimo 6
Anahim Lake 2 Nelson 1
Bella Coola 1 North Cowichan/Duncan 6
Burnaby 3 North Okanagan/Vernon 10
Burns Lake 3 North Vancouver 7
Campbell River 1 Oceanside 1
Castlegar 2 Penticton 3
Chase 2 Port Alberni 2
Chemanius 1 Port Mann Freeway Patrol 1
Chetwynd 1 Powell River 1
Chilliwack 8 Prince George 7
Clearwater 1 Prince Reupert 6
Comox Valley 2 Princeton 1
Coquitlam 1 Richmond 4
Cranbrook 1 Ridge Meadows 5
Creston 1 Salmon Arm 1
Dawson Creek 1 Shawnigan Lake 1
Forst St. John 1 Sicamous 1
Grand Forks 1 Sidney/North Saanich 1
Kamloops 10 Smithers 1
Kelowna 5 Sooke 1
Kitimat 1 Squamish 3
Ladysmith 2 Surrey 15
Lake Country 3 Terrace 2
Langley 4 Tofino 3
Limis/Nass Valley 1 Tsay Keh Dene 1
Lytton 2 Vanderhoof 2
Masset 2 West Kelowna 1
Merritt 3 West Shore 1
Midway 1 Whistler 1











































2017-2018 2018-2019 2019-2020 2020-2021
IIO DEATH FILE CLASSIFICATIONS
Ethnicity - Affected Persons
In fiscal 2020-2021, the  IIO began collecting  ethnicity data  of affected persons. This information was 





Latin, Central or South American
Did Not Self-Identify
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BCFirstRespondersMentalHealth.com
IT’S TIME TO SPEAK UP ABOUT MENTAL HEALTH.
















































For more resources on better understanding mental health in the context of the 
experiences and pressures of first responders, as well as the broader population, 
visit the following link.
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2020 POLICE REPORTED CRIME
In July 2021, Statistics Canada 
released its “Police-reported 
crime statistics in Canada, 
2020” report. Highlights of this 
recent collection of crime data 
include:
• There were 2,014,779 crimes (excluding traffic) 
reported to Canadian police in 2020; this 
represents a decrease of 195,015  crimes reported 
when compared to 2019.
• The total crime rate decreased -10%. This 
includes a violent crime rate decrease  of -2% and 





T=Total Crime Severity Index
V=Violent Crime Severity Index

















































Police-Reported Crime Severity Indexes
Police-Reported Homicide Offences
Province Rate Homicides Rate change 
(2019 to 2020)
NWT 13.29 6 -
NU 7.62 3 -
SK 5.09 60 +9%
MB 4.50 62 -14%
NS 3.57 35 +478%
AB 3.14 139 +37%
BC 1.90 98 +8%
NB 1.79 14 -18%
ON 1.59 234 -9%
QC 1.01 87 +12%
NF 0.77 4 -
PEI 0.63 1 -
YK 0.00 0 -
Canada 1.95 743 +7%
The Crime Severity Index (CSI) is another measure of police-reported crime. 
Each offence is assigned a weight, derived from sentences handed down by 
criminal courts. The more serious the average sentence, the higher the offence is 
weighted. The weighted offences are then summed and divided by the population. 
An overall CSI has been created as well as a violent CSI and non-violent CSI.
Source: Statistics Canada, 2021, “Police-reported crime statistics in 
Canada, 2020, Catalogue no. 85-002-X, released on July 27, 2021.









































Police-Reported Crime Rates per 100,000 population
Canada’s Top Ten Reported Crimes
Offence Number
Theft of $5,000 or less (non-motor vehicle) 343,521
Mischief 297,185
Administration of Justice Violations 201,462
Assault-level 1 177,580
Fraud 138,011
Break and Enter 137,516
Disturb the Peace 107,258
Shoplifting Under $5,000 90,904
Uttering Threats 84,171
Theft of Motor Vehicle 78,155
Homicide
There were 743  homicides reported, 56 more than 
the previous year. Ontario had the most homicides 
at 234, followed by Alberta (139), British Columbia 
(98) and Quebec (87). Nova Scotia  had 35 
homicides, including 22 deaths resulting form a 
mass shooting. As for provincial homicide rates, 
Saskatchewan had the highest rate (5.09 per 
100,000 population) followed by Manitoba (4.50), 
Nova Scotia (3.57), and Alberta (3.14). As for 
Census Metropolitan Areas (CMA’s), Thunder Bay, 
ON had the highest homicide rate at 6.35. The 




Top CMA Homicide Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Thunder Bay, ON 6.35 Greater Sudbury, ON 2.96
Winnipeg, MB 4.93 Brantford, ON 2.62
Regina, SK 4.54 Calgary, AB 2.53
Saskatoon, SK 4.10 Hamilton, ON 2.32
Edmonton, AB 3.19 Peterborough, ON 2.32
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Robbery
In 2020 there were 19,268 robberies 
reported, resulting in a national rate of 51 
robberies per 100,000 population. Manitoba 
had the  highest robbery rate  followed by 
Saskatchewan and the Northwest Territories.
• Winnipeg, MB had the highest CMA rate for 
robbery in Canada (228), down -18% from 2019 
rate. Saguenay, QC & Quebec City, QC both had 
the lowest rate (12). Peterborough, ON reported a 
jump of 45% in its robbery rate. Guelph, ON 
(+36%), Kingston, ON (+33%), and Saint John, 
NB (+31%) also saw high double digit increases. 
• Five CMAs reported declines of robbery of more 
than 30%: Belleville, ON (-49%) Saguenay, QC, 
(-46%), Moncton, NB (-41%), Quebec City, QC 
(-36%), Barrie, ON (-36%), and Ottawa, ON 
(-31%). 
Break and Enter
In 2020 there were 137,516 break-
ins reported to police. The national 
break-in rate was 362 break-ins per 
100,000 people. The Northwest 
Territories had the highest break-in 




Rate Robberies Rate change 
2019 to 2020
MB 162 2,240 -17%
SK 80 946 -16%
NWT 75 34 -6%
AB 66 2,926 -21%
ON 48 7,117 -21%
BC 52 2,674 -8%
NF 24 127 -23%
QC 32 2,761 -20%
YK 55 23 +3%
NU 28 11 -28%
NS 27 267 +11%
NB 17 134 -21%
PEI 5 8 -67%
CANADA 51 19,268 -18%
Top Ten CMA Robbery Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Winnipeg, MB 228 Calgary, AB 66
Thunder Bay, ON 107 Brantford, ON 65
Regina, SK 107 Windsor, ON 62
Saskatoon, SK 96 Vancouver, BC 62




Rate Break-ins Rate change 
2019 to 2020
NU 765 301 -33%
NWT 819 370 -22%
SK 729 8,592 -15%
MB 625 8,627 -23%
AB 663 29,316 -13%
BC 480 24,704 -15%
YK 478 201 -24%
NB 399 3,115 -16%
NF 291 1,521 -24%
ON 267 39,382 -14%
QC 218 18,674 -21%
NS 243 2,375 -11%
PEI 212 338 -29%
CANADA 362 137,516 -16%
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-17%
THE CRIME SEVERITY INDEX (CSI)  CRIMES AFFECTING THE 
CHANGE IN CSI BECAUSE 
OF THEIR VOLUME AND 
SEVERITY 
The rate of police reported opioid offences (excluding heroin) 
increased 34% in 2020. Of all specific drug offences reported 
in 2020, opioid offences were the only ones to have 
increased from the previous year.
The rate of total fraud   remained stable for the first 
time in 9 years; however, rates of identity theft (+52%) 




56 MORE THAN 
IN 2019.
5 LARGEST INCREASES 











was 8% lower than in 2019, the first decrease after  
5 years of increases. In the first year of the pandemic, the Violent CSI decreased 4%, while the 
Non-violent CSI decreased 10%. This was the largest year-over-year change recorded for the 
Non-violent CSI.
CSI value, 2020
Change in CSI, 
2019 to 2020
IN 2020, MOST PROVINCES AND ONE TERRITORY REPORTED DECREASES IN THEIR CSI. 
The number of police-reported hate crimes increased 37% to 2,669 incidents. Hate crimes 
targeting the Black population, East or Southeast Asian population, Indigenous population, and 































































TYPE OF OFFENCE RATE
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice and Community Safety Statistics, Uniform Crime Reporting Survey.
“Police-reported crime statistics in Canada, 2020.” Juristat. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 85-002-X. © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of Industry, 2021
Catalogue number: 11-627-M  |  ISBN: 978-0-660-39073-4
1. While the crime rate measures the volume of crime, the Crime Severity Index (CSI) measures both the volume and severity of crime. To determine severity, all crimes are assigned a weight based on actual sentences handed down by 
courts in all provinces and territories. More serious crimes are assigned higher weights, while less serious crimes are assigned lower weights. As a result, more serious offences have a greater impact on changes in the index.
2.  Total homicide victims excludes persons where the Indigenous identity or gender identity was reported as unknown by police (5% of victims in 2020). Rates are calculated per 100,000 Indigenous population by sex, and per 100,000 
non-Indigenous population by sex.


































































In 2016, the Supreme Court of Canada established 
a new framework for applying s. 11(b) of the 
Charter — the right to be tried within a reasonable 
time — R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27. A majority of 
the Supreme Court created a presumptive ceiling 
on the time it should take to bring an accused 
person to trial: 
• 18  months for cases going to trial in the
provincial court; and
• 30  months for cases going to trial in the
superior court.
In October 2016, Alberta’s Justice and Solicitor 
General began tracking defence applications to 
dismiss cases based on the Jordan timelines. 
Between October 25, 2016 and March 31, 2021, 
there  were 332 Jordan applications filed in Alberta 
courts.
Of the 332  applications, they were 
disposed of in the following manner:
• 14 pending;
• 101 dismissed by the Court;
• 37  granted (two being appealed by
Crown);
• 59 abandoned by defence
• 52  proactively stayed by the Crown
(on the basis that they would not have
survived a Jordan application); and
• 69 were resolved (unrelated to Jordan).
Charter of Rights
s. 11 Any person charged with
an offence has the right: ...




















• “Once the presumptive ceiling is exceeded, the burden 
shifts to the Crown to rebut the presumption of 
unreasonableness on the basis of exceptional circumstances. 
Exceptional circumstances lie outside the Crown’s control in that 
(1) they are reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable, 
and (2) they cannot reasonably be remedied. If the exceptional 
circumstance relates to a discrete event, the delay reasonably 
attributable to that event is subtracted. If the exceptional 
circumstance arises from the case’s complexity, the delay is 
reasonable.”
• “Below the presumptive ceiling, in clear cases, the defence 
may show that the delay is unreasonable. To do so, the defence 
must establish two things: (1) it took meaningful steps that 
demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings; and 
(2) the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.”
Justices Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Brown in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 at para. 105. 
Dispositions of Alberta Jordan Applications
Source: Jordan Applications
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NATIONAL DNA DATA BANK
The National DNA Data Bank 
(NDDB) was created by an 
Act of Parliament which came 
into force in 2000. The NDDB 
maintains several indices 
including the Convicted 
Offenders Index (COI), the 
Crime Scene Index (CSI) and 
the Victims Index (VI).
As at June 30, 2021 there  were  415,450 DNA 
profiles contained in the COI. The NDDB receives 
400 to 500 convicted offender samples per week. 
There was also 187,499 DNA profiles contained in 
the CSI.
Comparisons
Assistance is sometimes provided to criminal 
investigation through the following comparisons:
Offender Hits
• CSI > COI: Comparing DNA profiles found at 
Crime Scenes (CSI Index) to the DNA profiles of 
Convicted Offenders (COI Index). This can help 
identify  a suspect and is known as an “offender 
hit”. This process can assist in eliminating a 
suspect if no match is made.
As of June 30, 2021 there were 67,765 offender 
hits (CSI > COI). As of March 31, 2021 offender hits 
related to the following case types:
Forensic Hits
• CSI > CSI: Comparing DNA profiles found at 
different Crime Scenes (CSI Index to CSI Index). 
This can help identify links between crime 
scenes and is known as a “forensic hit”. This 
process can assist in determining whether a 
serial offender is involved in a number of 
crimes. 
As at June 30, 2021 there were  7,362 forensic hits 
(CSI > CSI). 
Source:  National DNA Data Bank Statistics [accessed 
August 11, 2021]
Index Total DNA Profiles
Convicted Offender (COI) 415,450
Crime Scene (CSI) 187,499
Victims Index (VI) 63
Total DNA Profiles 603,012
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SUCCESS RATE OF APPEALS 
RISES IN BC’s HIGHEST COURT
According to the BC Court of Appeal’s 2020 Annual 
Report, the success rate for challenges to a  lower 
court ruling was the highest in the last five years. Of 
the 110 criminal appeal dispositions in 2020, 49 
were allowed. This represented a 45% success rate. 
That means 45% of the time a  lower court judge 
got it wrong or, in the language of the courts, erred. 
Remember, an appellant, whether Crown or the 
accused, must prove that the decision made by the 
lower court was incorrect because the judge made 
a mistake in understanding the facts (error of fact) 
or in applying the law (error in law). An appeal is 
not a new trial. 
There are no witnesses testifying during an appeal 
nor is there a  jury. In addition, even if the judge 
erred, it must also be proven that the  mistake 
significantly affected the outcome of the case.
• In 2020 there were a total of 129 criminal 
appeals filed. This was down 41% from 2019. 
 
• Usually an appeal is heard 
by a panel of three (3) 
judges, but sometimes more 
will sit. In 2020 there was 
only  one criminal appeal heard by a panel of 
five (5) judges. 
Reasons an accused may appeal a sentence include 
(1) it is excessive  (too harsh), (2) it is illegal (not 
authorized by  statute), or (3) the sentencing judge 
erred in applying one of more principles of 
sentencing (ignored or overemphasized them) and 
this error impacted the sentence. Reasons an 
accused may appeal a conviction include (1) the 
verdict was unreasonable or couldn’t be supported 
by the evidence, (2) the judge made an error of law, 
or (3) there was a miscarriage of justice.
The success rate for civil appeals had a similar fate. 
A slightly higher percentage (46%) were successful 
in 2020.
Criminal Court Dispositions
Year 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Appeals 
Allowed
32 42 30 50 49
Percent (%) 
Allowed 
22% 34% 27% 32% 45%
Appeals 
Dismissed
114 82 83 104 61
Percent (%) 
Dismissed
78% 66% 73% 68% 55%
Total 146 124 113 154 110
Civil Court Dispositions
Year 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Appeals 
Allowed
117 112 104 97 87
Percent (%) 
Allowed 
41% 40% 40% 42% 46%
Appeals 
Dismissed
169 168 155 134 102
Percent (%) 
Dismissed
59% 60% 60% 58% 54%
Total 286 280 259 231 189
Criminal Appeals Filed
Year 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Appeals 
Filed
209 246 258 219 129
Sentence 85 97 107 90 49
Conviction 82 95 118 92 56
Summary 
Conviction
11 11 10 11 12
Acquittal & 
Other
31 43 23 26 12
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PRODUCTION ORDER ITO NEED 
NOT ESTABLISH ITS EXECUTION 
WILL AFFORD EVIDENCE 
AGAINST ACCUSED
The Ontario Court of Appeal has 
he ld tha t the i s suance o f a 
production order does not require 
reasonable grounds to believe that its 
execution could provide evidence 
against a particular accused. In R. v. Mawick, 
2021 ONCA 177 the accused argued that an 
Information to Obtain (ITO) used to obtain a 
production order for a money service business 
(“Cash House”) did not establish a basis to believe 
it could provide any evidence that he had 
committed a  fraud. Therefore, the warrant should 
not have been issued. In rejecting this ground of 
appeal, Justice Rouleau, for a unanimous Court of 
Appeal, found the affiant to the ITO need not satisfy 
the issuing justice that there  are  reasonable  grounds 
to believe that the  record holder has documents 
that will afford evidence against the accused:
• “Production orders are presumed valid and 
properly issued. When the validity of the order 
is confirmed by a reviewing judge, that ruling is 
entitled to deference on appeal.”  [references 
omitted, para. 36]
• “In order to issue a  production order under 
s.  487.014(2) of the Criminal Code, the judge 
or justice making the production order against 
a person must be satisfied that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe: (a) an offence 
has been or will be committed, and (b) the 
document or data is in the person’s possession 
or control and will afford evidence respecting 
the commission of the offence.” [para. 7]
• “Section 487.014(2)(b) only  requires the affiant 
to show reasonable grounds to believe that a 
production order will afford evidence 
“respecting the commission of an offence”. ... 
Put simply, there was no requirement to 
establish that the Cash House production order 
would afford evidence against the [accused] 
directly.” [references omitted, para. 40]
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
BY THE BOOK:
s. 487.014 Criminal Code
General production order
s. 487.014  (1) Subject to sections 487.015 
to 487.018, on ex parte application made by 
a peace officer or public officer, a justice or 
judge may order a person to produce a document that is 
a copy of a document that is in their possession or 
control when they receive the order, or to prepare and 
produce a document containing data that is in their 
possession or control at that time.
Conditions for making order
(2) Before making the order, the justice or judge must 
be satisfied by information on oath in Form 5.004 that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that
(a) an offence has been or will be committed under this 
or any other Act of Parliament; and
(b) the document or data is in the person’s possession 
or control and will afford evidence respecting the 
commission of the offence.
Form
(3) The order is to be in Form 5.005.
Limitation
(4) A person who is under investigation for the offence 
referred to in subsection (2) may not be made subject to 
an order.
“Section 487.014(2)(b) only 
requires the affiant to show 
reasonable grounds to believe 
that a production order will 
afford evidence ‘respecting the 
commission of an offence’.” 
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EVIDENCE OF PRIOR 
UNCHARGED CRIMINAL 
ACTIVITY OK IN ITO
The British Columbia Court of Appeal 
says police can use prior uncharged 
criminal activity in an ITO to 
establish reasonable grounds for a 
search warrant. In R. v. Le, 2021 
BCCA 52, police  in BC used the accused’s dated 
criminal record for possessing a narcotic and 
possessing drugs for the purposes of trafficking in 
an ITO to obtain a search warrant. The ITO also 
included information connecting the accused to 
more recent large, outdoor illicit marihuana grow 
operations in Ontario where police saw him on 
two properties where marihuana was being 
cultivated. He had also purchased an industrial 
water pump that was installed at one of the grow 
operations.
At trial in BC Provincial Court, the  judge found the 
accused’s drug related convictions were relevant 
but dated, and it was unclear whether the 
circumstances related to those offences bore  any 
similarity to the current case. As for including the 
information about the Ontario investigation in 
which the accused was a person of interest, the 
trial judge noted there was divergent case law on 
the issue that needed to be reconciled.
Prior Uncharged Criminal Activity
Justice Groberman, speaking for the Court of 
Appeal, found earlier BC cases (R. v. Loewen, 
2016  BCCA 351; R v. Della Penna, 2012 BCCA 3; 
and R. v. Hutchings, (1996) 111 C.C.C.  (3d) 215 
(BCCA), leave to appeal ref’d, [1997] S.C.C.A. 
No. 21) “stand for the proposition that reference 
to pr ior suspected cr iminal act iv i ty i s 
appropriately  included in an ITO, as long as the 
prior activity  was of a type that is relevant to the 
investigation, and as long as the prior suspected 
activity did not result in charges that were 
dismissed.” He continued:
Subsequent authority also appears to confirm 
that the approach taken in Loewen is the 
correct one. In R. v. Li, 2020 SCC 12, the issue 
was entrapment. The question for the Court 
was whether the police had “reasonable 
suspicion” that a specific phone number was 
being used in a dial-a-dope operation before 
they called the number and arranged to 
purchase drugs. The anonymous tip provided 
to the police referred to a specific vehicle that 
was allegedly used in the operation. The police 
determined that the vehicle belonged to an 
individual “with an extensive and recent 
history of suspected dial-a-dope drug 
dealings”, though he had not been charged. 
The Court found that evidence to be important 
in supporting a reasonable suspicion.
In terms of the weight to be given to the 
evidence of suspected criminal activity, it is 
important to recognize that the judicial justice 
of the peace was obliged to consider all of the 
information in the ITO together, not to reach 
separate conclusions as to the cogency of each 
piece of relevant evidence.  ... [para. 82-8]
Insufficient Investigation
The trial judge also suggested that additional 
investigation was necessary before the information 
in the ITO could be considered. In deciding 
whether a warrant could be quashed because an 
investigation was insufficiently thorough, Justice 
Groberman stated:
It is important, for both the issuing justice and 
the reviewing judge to recognize that it is for 
the investigating authorities to decide how to 
conduct their investigations and how deeply to 
“[R]eference to prior suspected criminal activity is appropriately included 
in an ITO, as long as the prior activity was of a type that is relevant to the 
investigation, and as long as the prior suspected activity did not result in 
charges that were dismissed.”
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delve into particular questions. The mere fact 
that further inquiries could have been 
conducted will not mean that a search warrant 
cannot issue. ...
I would make two observations that, in minor 
respects, may be seen as qualifications to the 
general proposition that investigations that 
might have been undertaken, but were not, are 
not to be considered in assessing whether a 
search warrant should have issued.
First, perfunctory investigations will typically 
fail to provide a sufficient factual foundation to 
establish a credibly-based probability that a 
search will uncover evidence of a crime. A 
justice of the peace examining an ITO is 
entitled to consider the significance of 
evidentiary gaps in it. Where obvious inquiries 
have not been undertaken, the credibility of 
any suspicion will be impacted, and may well 
be undermined. Where the ITO does not 
provide evidence sufficient to meet the 
“credibly-based probability” threshold, no 
search warrant can issue.
Second, an ITO will be found to be misleading 
where investigators have failed to disclose 
information that was known or ought to have 
been known to them.  ...
The requirement that an ITO include all 
information that “ought to be known”, then, 
does not go so far as to impose on the police a 
legal obligation to conduct a “thorough” or 
“diligent” investigation, as desirable as such an 
investigation may be.
While [R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8] does ... speak 
of “police diligence” when applying for search 
warrants, it is referring to diligence in preparing 
the affidavit material, and not diligence in the 
underlying investigations.
The question for the judge in this case, 
therefore, was not whether the police 
investigation was sufficiently thorough, but 
rather whether the nature and result of the 
investigations were adequately described in the 
ITO, and whether the investigations gave rise to 
a credibly-based probability that an illegal 
marihuana production operation was taking 
place on the property. [references omitted, 
paras. 47-53]
A subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Canada was dismissed on July 15, 2021. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“The requirement that an ITO include all information that ‘ought to be 
known’, then, does not go so far as to impose on the police a legal 
obligation to conduct a ‘thorough’ or ‘diligent’ investigation, as desirable 
as such an investigation may be.”
“It is important, for both the issuing justice and the reviewing judge to 
recognize that it is for the investigating authorities to decide how to 
conduct their investigations and how deeply to delve into particular 
questions. The mere fact that further inquiries could have been conducted 
will not mean that a search warrant cannot issue.”
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ASSAULT PO FORMS UNLAWFUL 
ACT FOR UNLAWFULLY 
CAUSING BODILY HARM
R. v. Eddison, 2021 BCCA 168
Two uniformed officers working night 
shift sat in their unmarked police car 
at about 1:35 a.m. They were parked 
in an entertainment area. The 
accused, who was siting on a  nearby 
bench, mouthed words and gestured at police. He 
then unsteadily  walked towards the police car and 
spoke to the passenger officer. He appeared to be 
frustrated and angry, and smelled of a strong odour 
of alcohol. He asked the  officer for a for a cigarette. 
The officer driving the police car moved it a short 
distance to get away from the accused, but he 
followed and continued to ask  the passenger officer 
for a  cigarette. Although the officer told the 
accused he did not have a cigarette, the accused 
repeated his demand and said, “Give me the 
fucking cigarette  or else I’ll fucking kill you”. The 
passenger officer got out of the police car to arrest 
the accused for uttering a threat. The accused 
backed away and took a fighting stance, telling the 
officer, “Watch out, or I will fuck you up.” 
The officer told the accused he was under arrest. 
The accused replied, “No, I’m fucking not”. The 
officer moved forward about two meters and took 
hold of the accused’s right arm. The accused 
grabbed the officer and pushed him back towards 
the police car. The officer regained some control 
and swept the accused’s leg, taking him to the 
ground. During the takedown, the other officer, 
who had also got out of the police car to assist, 
suffered a serious injury  to her leg. She  felt a bone 
protruding from her skin and her foot appeared to 
be bent backwards. She had suffered an open 
fracture to her left tibia  and fibula The accused was 
charged with uttering a threat and assaulting a 
police officer in the execution of his duty with 
respect to the arresting officer, and aggravated 
assault, assaulting a police officer causing bodily 
harm, aggravated assault of a police officer, and 
unlawfully causing bodily harm with respect to the 
injured officer.
British Columbia Provincial Court
The accused was convicted of both 
charges related to the  arresting officer. 
He was acquitted, however, of the 
charges related to the officer suffering 
the fracture  to her leg. The trial judge had difficulty 
determining how the officer actually sustained her 
injury. He said the officer’s injury could have 
occurred in two plausible ways: (1) she was 
intentionally kicked by the  accused, or (2) the 
accused fell backwards onto her while  resisting 
arrest and assaulting the arresting officer. Because 
he could not resolve what caused the injury, the 
judge found the Crown had failed to meet its 
burden in proving any of the  charges involving the 
injured officer beyond a reasonable doubt. 
British Columbia Court Appeal
The Crown argued, among 
other things, that the trial judge 
erred in acquitting the accused 
in relation to the unlawfully 
causing bodily harm charge. In the Crown’s view, 
although it could not prove the accused intended 
BY THE BOOK:
s. 269 Criminal Code
Unlawfully causing bodily harm
Every one who unlawfully causes bodily harm 
to any person is guilty of
(a)  an indictable offence and liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.
s. 2 Definitions
“bodily harm means any hurt or injury to a person that 
interferes with the health or comfort of the person and 
that is more than merely transient or trifling in nature”.
Volume 21 Issue 4~July/August 2021
PAGE 30
and did in fact kick the officer, either of the two 
plausible  versions of events accepted by the trial 
judge were sufficient to prove the unlawfully 
causing bodily harm offence. 
Unlawful Cause Bodily Harm
Justice Butler, delivering 
the decision of the  Court 
of Appeal, noted the 
elements of s. 269 of the 
Criminal Code: 
Under s.  269 of the Code, it is an offence to 
unlawfully cause bodily harm to any person. 
The elements of the of fence are not 
controversial. The Crown must prove the 
following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
that the accused committed an underlying 
unlawful act; the objective foreseeability of 
non-trivial bodily harm; and that bodily harm 
resulted from the unlawful act. The mental 
element of the offence thus has two 
components: objective foreseeability of non-
trivial bodily harm; and the mental element 
required for the underlying offence or unlawful 
act. [reference omitted, para. 38]
The Crown suggested that the accused was engaged 
in an unlawful act — assaulting the arresting officer 
— and bodily  harm resulted. Justice Butler agreed. 
Either of the two scenarios described by the trial 
judge — an intentional kick or falling backwards 
while resisting arrest — were sufficient to support 
the first element of s. 269 (the unlawful act). 
As for the mental element, an inability to prove the 
necessary  intent for assault was not fatal to proving 
the intent for the distinct charge of unlawfully 
causing bodily harm. In this case, the mental 
element required for the underlying unlawful act — 
assaulting the arresting officer — had been proven. 
And, the defence had conceded that, if the accused 
was guilty of resisting arrest, it was reasonably 
foreseeable that some harm could occur. In light of 
this concession, the Crown had proven that harm 
was reasonably foreseeable. It was not necessary 
for the Crown to establish the specific harm caused 
— the leg fracture — was foreseeable. 
“[The accused] threatened [an officer], resisted 
arrest and fought against the lawful attempt to 
take him into custody,”  said Justice Butler. “[The 
accused’s] unlawful actions were a cause of the 
injury to [the other officer], whether he directly 
kicked her or she  was injured when he fell 
backwards into her and the police car door. While 
he may not have foreseen the prec i se 
consequences of his conduct, it was objectively 
foreseeable that his altercation with [the  arresting 
officer] could lead to an injury to him or to [the 
other officer] if she provided assistance.”
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s 
acquittal on the unlawfully cause bodily harm 
charge was set aside, a conviction was entered, and 
the matter was remitted to the trial court for 
sentencing.
Complete case available at www.court.gov.bc.ca
“Under s. 269 of the Code, it is an offence to unlawfully cause bodily harm 
to any person. The elements of the offence are not controversial. The 
Crown must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: that 
the accused committed an underlying unlawful act; the objective 
foreseeability of non-trivial bodily harm; and that bodily harm resulted 
from the unlawful act. The mental element of the offence thus has two 
components: objective foreseeability of non-trivial bodily harm; and the 
mental element required for the underlying offence or unlawful act.”
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‘MOTOR ASSISTED CYCLE’: 
MOTOR MUST BE CAPABLE OF 
SUPPLEMENTING HUMAN 
PROPULSION
R. v. Ghadban, 2021 BCCA 69
A police officer observed the accused 
riding a Motorino XMr scooter on a 
public road. His young son was also 
on the  scooter. The officer stopped 
the accused and asked him to 
produce his driver’s licence and proof of insurance, 
but the  accused was unable to do so. He was not 
licenced to drive a motor vehicle  and the scooter 
he was riding was not insured. The accused was 
issued violation tickets for driving without a  driver’s 
licence (s. 24(1)) and driving without insurance (s. 
24(3)) under BC’s Motor Vehicle Act (MVA). 
British Columbia Provincial Court
The accused disputed his violation tickets. 
Photographs of the scooter and an 
owner’s manual, which included 
operating instructions and specifications, 
were entered as exhibits. The scooter, 
which had a 500-watt electric direct drive motor in 
its rear wheel, resembled a motorcycle — 
handlebars, wheels, seat, suspension, frame and 
instrumentation — but it also had pedals attached 
to it. The pedals drove a chain connected to the 
rear wheel and could be removed without 
interfering with the ordinary operation of the 
scooter. The accused testified he had never used the 
pedals because he did not want to pedal the weight 
of the scooter, which he estimated at 300 lbs. He 
said the motor could not be used while pedaling 
and, if a rider chose to pedal the scooter, the motor 
was always off. He also said the scooter was 
incapable of exceeding 32 km/h.
The Judicial Justice found the vehicle operated by 
the accused was not a “motor assisted cycle” as 
defined by s. 1 of the MVA and, therefore, was not 
excluded from the definition of a “motor 
vehicle”. The Judicial Justice addressed both the 
propulsion aspect of the scooter (its electric 
propulsion did not assist human propulsion) as well 
as its wheel size (it was too small). In his view, the 
Motorino XMr was an electric scooter capable of 
being pedaled rather than a cycle assisted by 
electric propulsion. Since the scooter primarily 
relied on electric  propulsion it was not a motor 
assisted cycle within the meaning of the Motor 
Assisted Cycle Regulation. As a motor vehicle, its 
operation required a valid driver’s license and 
insurance. Since the accused did not have a valid 
driver’s license, and the  vehicle was not insured, 
the accused was convicted of the offences alleged 
in the violation ticket. 
British Columbia Supreme Court
The accused argued the Judicial Justice 
erred in convicting him of the offences 
charged. The appeal judge, however, 
agreed with the  trial judge’s conclusion 
that a Motorino XMr did not comply with the intent 
of the legislation, which was for a motor assisted 
cycle to supplement or assist the human power 
required to pedal the vehicle. The accused’s appeal 
was dismissed and his convictions upheld.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused argued, in part, that 
the appeal judge erred in 
upholding the judicial justice’s 
interpretation that a motor 
assisted cycle be primarily powered by human 
power, with electric power limited to a 
supplementary role.  
“Motor Vehicle” or “Motor Assisted Cycle”? 
Under BC’s MVA, a 
person requires a 
valid driver’s licence 
and insurance to 
operate a motor 
vehicle, but not to 
operate a motor 
assisted cycle. Both 
a motor vehicle and a motor assisted cycle are 
defined in s. 1 of the MVA.
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In addition, the Motor Assisted Cycle Regulation 
contains a number of requirements for motor 
assisted cycles. For example, a motor assisted cycle 
must have an electric motor that does not exceed 
500 watts and is not capable of propelling the cycle 
at a speed greater than 2 km/h on level ground, and 
its wheels must be 350 mm or more in diameter. 
Furthermore, it must be equipped with a motor 
shut-off:
Justice Groberman, speaking for a two-member 
majority, concluded that the proper interpretation 
of s. 3(2) in the Regulation meant that the motor of 
the motor assisted cycle must turn off or disengage 
in each of the three situations described, and not 
just in at least one of the situations:
It appears to me that s.  3(2) is a safety 
provision, designed to ensure that the motor is 
not providing motive force when the rider does 
something that shows that motive force is not 
required. Thus, the motor ought to disengage in 
each of the three situations. There would be no 
rationale for a regulation that required the 
motor to disengage in only one of the three 
situations. [para. 28]
In this case, the accused could not stop the motor 
by ceasing to pedal it because the motor would not 
operate while it was being pedaled and would 
already be off when pedaling stops. But his scooter 
would turn off or disengage in the other two 
situations. When the throttle control was released 
the motor was turned off, and when the brakes 
were applied the  motor stopped providing force to 
the wheel and was no longer powering it. 
Jusice Groberman also found “it is important to 
recognize that s. 3(2) does not require a  rider to 
be pedaling in order to start or engage the motor; 
rather, it says that if a person is pedaling, and 
stops, the motor must stop or disengage. There is, 
then, no prohibition on running the electric motor 
without pedaling at the same time.” Thus, riders 
are not prohibited from using the electric motor 
when the cycle is not being pedaled. 
The legislation does not require that a motor 
assisted cycle be primarily propelled by human 
power. Rather, it must be designed to be primarily 
propelled by human power, with electric power 
supplementing or assisting. In other words, the 
cycle must be designed in such a way that human 
power is the  primary force  intended to be used to 
power it and the electric motor is a secondary 
source of power, to assist the rider in cycling, not to 
be an alternative to it. Justice Groberman stated:
In my view, “motor assisted cycle” should not, 
without good reason, be interpreted to include 
a device where the motor can be used only as 
an alternative to human power, or a device 
where the use of human power is impractical. 
“motor vehicle” means a vehicle, not run on rails, 
that is designed to be self-propelled or propelled by 
electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, 
but does not include mobile equipment or a motor 
assisted cycle.
“motor assisted cycle” means a device
(a) to which pedals or hand cranks are attached that 
will allow for the cycle to be propelled by human 
power,
(b) on which a person may ride,
(c) to which is attached a motor of a prescribed type 
that has an output not exceeding the prescribed 
output, and
(d) that meets the other criteria prescribed under 
section 182.1 (3).
s. 3  (1) A motor assisted cycle must be equipped 
with a mechanism, separate from the accelerator 
controller, that
(a) allows the driver to turn the motors on and off 
from a normal seated position while operating the 
motor assisted cycle, or
(b) prevents the motors from turning on or 
engaging before the motor assisted cycle attains a 
speed of 3 km/hr.
(2) The motors of a motor assisted cycle must turn 
off or disengage if
(a) the operator stops pedaling,
(b) an accelerator controller is released, or
(c) a brake is applied.
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... The Motor Vehicle Act and Motor Assisted 
Cycle Regulation deliberately chose to use the 
words “motor assisted”, and the concept should 
be interpreted in a way that is, as far as 
possible, harmonious with the words chosen.
The regulation includes a provision in s. 3(2)(a) 
that specifically requires that the motor stop or 
disengage when the rider stops pedaling. In my 
view, that is telling. The drafter clearly 
contemplated a device that allowed the motor 
to be engaged while the rider was pedaling. 
That interpretation is consonant with the use of 
the term “motor assisted cycle”. As I see it, a 
device cannot be a motor assisted cycle unless 
it is designed so that the motor is capable of 
being used to supplement human propulsion.
In saying this, I do not suggest that a motor 
assisted cycle cannot have the motor operating 
without the rider pedaling. It is quite consistent 
with the idea of “motor assisted cycling” that 
the rider can, at times, stop pedaling and rest, 
re-engaging the motor using the accelerator 
controller. It is also completely consistent with 
the language of the regulation. What is not 
consistent with the concept of a “motor assisted 
cycle” or with the regulation is an electric 
scooter where the motor is never used to assist 
human-powered cycl ing, but i s used 
exclusively as an alternative to it. [paras. 47-50]
And further:
I do not suggest that a motor assisted cycle 
must be incapable of being operated when the 
rider is not pedaling. I say only that the design 
must contemplate human power being a 
primary means of propulsion, and must allow 
for a person to pedal at the same time as the 
motor is providing assistance. [para. 53]
In this case, the  accused’s scooter was not a “motor 
assisted cycle” for two reasons:
1. “[T]he scooter is too heavy to be practical as a 
human-powered device. It is designed to be 
used as a  motor-scooter, not a pedal powered 
cycle. That does not comply with the clear 
intention of the legislation.”
2. “[T]he evidence shows that the motor cannot 
operate at any time when the rider is pedaling. 
The motor is only an alternative  to human-
powered cycling, not an assistance to it.”
The appeal judge did not err in finding the 
accused’s scooter was not a  motor assisted cycle. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and his 
convictions were affirmed. 
A Different View
Justice  Saunders disagreed with the 
majority. In her view, the accused’s 
scooter-like device met the first four 
requirements of the definition of a 
motor assisted cycle. It had pedals attached, it 
allowed for propulsion by human power, it was a 
device  on which a  person could ride, and it had a 
motor attached of the type prescribed in the 
Regulation. She also found the scooter complied 
wi th s . 3 o f the Regu la t ion , inc lud ing 
disengagement of the motor. 
The only issue which 
required further exploration 
w a s t h e w h e e l s i z e . 
H o w e v e r , t h e t e r m 
“wheel” was not defined. 
I f t h e “ w h e e l ” w a s 
measured from rim edge to 
rim edge  it was likely  too 
s m a l l , b u t i f i t w a s 
measured from tire  edge to tire edge  it was likely 
large enough. Since the wheel size was not 
properly addressed at trial, Justice Saunders would 
allow the appeal, set aside the convictions and 
remit the charges back to Provincial Court for a 
fresh determination on the matter. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“[A] device cannot be a motor assisted cycle unless it is designed so that the 
motor is capable of being used to supplement human propulsion.”
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9/11: A SOMBER REMINDER OF 
THE ULTIMATE SACRIFICE
According to the Officer Down Memorial Page, the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 caused 
more law enforcement line of duty deaths than any 
other single  incident in U.S. history. One officer, 
who had tried to gain control from the hijackers, 
was killed when United Flight 93 crashed in 
Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Another 71 officers were 
killed when the two World Trade Center buildings 
collapsed in New York City. And, as of August 27, 
2021 the Memorial Page identified more than 300 
officers who died from a 9/11 related illness.
HONOUR ROLL
  
American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals Humane Law Enforcement, NY 
• Special Investigator Diane DiGiacomo
Arlington County Police Department, VA 
• Corporal Harvey Snook, III
Cayuga County Sheriff's Office, NY
• Undersheriff Stephen B. McLoud
City University of New York Department of Public 
Safety, NY 
• Deputy Chief John P. McKee
Connecticut State Police, CT 
• Trooper First Class Eugene Kenneth Baron, Jr.
• Trooper First Class Walter Greene, Jr.
Harrison Police Department, NY 
• Police Officer Walter L. Mallinson
Montclair State University Police Department, NJ
• Sergeant Christopher A. Vidro
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Nassau County Police Department, NY
• Police Officer Brian R. Abbondandelo
• Police Officer Charles Dennis Cole, Jr.
• Police Officer Peter Francis Curran
• Police Officer Peter Martino
• Police Officer Paul J. McCabe
• Police Officer James V. Quinn
• Lieutenant Michael P. Shea
New Jersey State Police, NJ 
• Lieutenant William George Fearon
• Staff Sergeant Bryan U. McCoy
• Trooper Robert Emmet Nagle
New Rochelle Police Department, NY 
• Detective Mark S. Gado
• Police Officer Kathleen O'Connor-Funigiello
New York City Fire Department - Bureau of Fire 
Investigation, NY 
• Fire Marshal Ronald P. Bucca
New York City Police Department, NY
• Detective Sandra Y. Adrian
• Detective I Gerard A. Ahearn
• Detective James John Albanese
• Chief of Detectives William H. Allee
• Detective Sixto Almonte
• Detective Luis Gustavo Alvarez
• Sergeant Alex W. Baez
• Police Officer Curtis Joseph Bako
• Police Officer Karen E. Barnes
• Detective Thomas J. Barnitt
• Police Officer Ronald G. Becker, Jr.
• Detective Aslyn A. Beckles
• Police Officer James A. Betso
• Sergeant Gerard Thomas Beyrodt
• Police Officer Derrick Bishop
• Police Officer Scott R. Blackshaw
• Police Officer Frank M. Bolusi
• Deputy Chief Steven Joseph Bonano
• Sergeant Patrick J. Boyle
• Sergeant William Brautigam
• Police Officer Thomas Gerard Brophy
• Lieutenant Rebecca A. Buck
• Police Officer James M. Burke
• Captain Carmine C. Cantalino
• Police Officer Audrey P. Capra
• Police Officer Madeline Carlo
• Detective Megan K. Carr-Wilks
• Detective Joseph A. Cavitolo
• Police Officer Yolanda Cawley
• Sergeant Christopher M. Christodoulou
• Police Officer Peter D. Ciaccio
• Lieutenant Steven L. Cioffi
• Sergeant Charles J. Clark
• Police Officer Daniel Charles Conroy
• Sergeant John Gerard Coughlin
• Sergeant Patrick T. Coyne
• Detective Christopher Edward Cranston
• Detective Angel Antonio Creagh
• Sergeant Michael Sean Curtin
• Detective Kevin Anthony Czartoryski
• Police Officer John D'Allara
• Police Officer Anthony D'Erasmo
• Detective Annetta G. Daniels
• Police Officer Vincent G. Danz
• Sergeant Garrett S. Danza
• Detective Michael Kenneth Davis
• Police Officer Anthony DeJesus
• Deputy Chief Vincent A. DeMarino
• Police Officer Michael O. Diamond
• Detective Corey J. Diaz
• Detective Leroy Dixon
• Police Officer Kenneth Xavier Domenech
• Police Officer Jerome Mark Patrick Dominguez
• Police Officer Stephen Patrick Driscoll
• Police Officer Renee Dunbar
• Police Officer Robert M. Ehmer
• Police Officer Mark Joseph Ellis
• Police Officer Otto R. Espinoza
• Detective Pedro Esponda, Jr.
• Police Officer William P. Farley
• Police Officer Robert Fazio, Jr.
• Detective Luis G. Fernandez
• Sergeant Paul Michael Ferrara
• Police Officer Keith A. Ferrara
• Police Officer John P. Ferrari
• Police Officer Edward M. Ferraro
• Inspector Donald G. Feser
• Detective Carmen M. Figueroa
• Police Officer Alexander Figueroa
• Police Officer Nicholas G. Finelli
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• Detective Stuart F. Fishkin
• Police Officer Edward J. Fitzgerald
• Lieutenant Jeffrey W. Francis
• Sergeant Gary M. Franklin
• Detective Sean Patrick Franklin
• Police Officer Frank L. Gagliano
• Police Officer Scott N. Gaines
• Captain Barry Galfano
• Police Officer Thomas J. Gallagher
• Sergeant Michael J. Galvin
• Police Officer Deborah A. Garbutt-Jeff
• Police Officer Matthew J. Gay
• Police Officer Judy Ann Ghany-Barounis
• Police Officer Anthony C. Giambra, Jr.
• Detective Peter "Pietro" Gianfrancesco
• Detective James Thomas Giery
• Sergeant Rodney C. Gillis
• Captain Edward Charles Gilpin
• Detective Charles Gilbert Gittens, Jr.
• Detective Michael E. Glazer
• Police Officer James Junior Godbee
• Detective John E. Goggin
• Police Officer Michael H. Grannis
• Police Officer Robert C. Grossman
• Police Officer Dave E. Guevara
• Inspector James Guida
• Sergeant Charles R. Gunzelman
• Police Officer Diane F. Halbran
• Police Officer Michael J. Hance
• Police Officer Anthony R. Hanlon
• Sergeant Claire T. Hanrahan
• Police Officer Raymond Harris
• Detective Kevin George Hawkins
• Police Officer Joseph F. Heid
• Police Officer Robert Bernard Helmke
• Detective Michael R. Henry
• Detective Alick W. Herrmann
• Detective William J. Holfester
• Police Officer Richard G. Holland
• Detective Nathaniel Holland, Jr.
• Detective Steven Hom
• Police Officer Demetrias Hopkins
• Detective Charles James Humphry
• Sergeant Michael Vincent Incontrera
• Sergeant Wayne A. Jackson
• Police Officer Richard Jakubowsky
• Police Officer Cheryl D. Johnson
• Police Officer Paul J. Johnson
• Police Officer Louise M. Johnston
• Sergeant Scott Johnston
• Police Officer Robert W. Kaminski
• Police Officer Charles M. Karen
• Detective William D. Kinane
• Police Officer William J. King
• Police Officer Ronald Philip Kloepfer
• Police Officer Gary Lee Koch
• Police Officer Kelly Christine Korchak
• Police Officer Fred J. Krines
• Detective John F. Kristoffersen
• Detective Stephen T. Kubinski
• Police Officer Thomas Michael Langone
• Detective Robert F. Larke
• Sergeant Mark Lawler
• Police Officer James Patrick Leahy
• Detective Michael Lawrence Ledek
• Detective Jeffrey A. Lee
• Inspector Justin C. Lenz
• Police Officer Andrew J. Lewis
• Detective Christian R. Lindsay
• Lieutenant Luis A. Lopez
• Police Officer Richard Lopez
• Detective Thomas J. Lyons
• Police Officer Frank Gerard Macri
• Police Officer David Mahmoud
• Police Officer Shaun M. Mahoney
• Detective John J. Marshall
• Sergeant Robert P. Masci
• Police Officer Vito S. Mauro
• Police Officer Gary Gerald Mausberg
• Lieutenant Jacqueline McCarthy
• Police Officer Brian Grady McDonnell
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R. v. Smeltzer, 2021 ONCA 472
I n 2 0 1 5 , e x p e r i e n c e d d r u g 
investigators were conducting 
surveillance in an area known for 
drug activity. They saw the driver of 
a vehicle, unrelated to their current 
drug trafficking investigation, behave in a 
suspicious manner. The driver first parked in a lot in 
front of an apartment building, which was one in 
cluster of apartment buildings. He appeared to be 
looking around and texting. The driver then circled 
around one of the buildings, exited the parking lot, 
and parked on a  nearby public road which 
bordered the  parking lot. The accused then 
approached this vehicle on foot from the  direction 
of the parking lot of the apartment complex. 
The accused entered the vehicle. The vehicle then 
drove a short distance down the road, turned 
around, and then returned to the  parking lot. This 
time it came to a stop near the front of a different 
apartment. This area was a more  “secluded spot” 
than the “exposed” parking area in front of the 
building where the  vehicle had first parked. Once 
the vehicle stopped, officers observed the accused 
passing something to the driver. Approximately 30 
seconds later, the accused exited the  vehicle and 
the vehicle left.
As the accused was about to 
enter one of the apartment 
buildings, an officer, by 
ruse, induced the  accused 
to approach him. As the 
accused got close, the 
officer began to smell the 
strong odour of marijuana 
“coming from the area of [the accused’s] person 
and the backpack”. The accused was arrested and a 
search of his backpack incidental to arrest revealed 
about 259 grams of marihuana wrapped in plastic 
and a “large bundle  of cash”. Upon a search of the 
accused’s person, three cellphones were located.
Ontario Court of Justice
The judge found the police did not 
breach the accused’s ss. 8 (unreasonable 
search) or 9 (arbitrary detention) Charter 
r i gh t s . The judge accep ted the 
experienced arresting officer’s evidence that 
marijuana has a  “strong pungent”  odour and that 
he could smell it even though it was wrapped in 
plastic and concealed inside a backpack. The smell 
of marihuana, along with the cumulative 
observations, provided reasonable grounds for 
arresting the accused and searching him. The 
accused was convicted of possessing marijuana for 
the purpose of trafficking. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused contended that 
the trial judge erred in finding 
that the arresting officer had 
the requis i te reasonable 
grounds to arrest and search him. First, he 
submitted that the trial judge did not consider the 
the arresting officer’s reliance 
on the low-income, high-
crime nature of the area, 
w h i c h w a s o f f e r e d a s 
supporting  his grounds for 
a r r e s t , was c la s s -based 
discrimination that contaminated the officer’s 
subjective grounds. Second, the accused suggested 
that the officer’s grounds for arrest were not 
objectively reasonable because the observed 
conduct of the parties was neutral and therefore an 
unreliable indicator of drug trafficking activity. 
Finally, he argued that the arresting officer’s 
evidence that he had smelled marijuana coming 
from the accused and his backpack should not have 
been accepted.
The Court of Appeal rejected the accused’s 
assertions, and concluded that the trial judge was 
entitled to find that the arresting officer had 
subjective grounds to believe there was a credibly-
based probability that the accused had engaged in 
drug trafficking, and that this belief was objectively 
reasonable.
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Nature of the Neighbourhood
The Court of Appeal opined that the arresting 
officer’s consideration of high-crime character of 
the area was problematic. “We agree that one’s 
mere presence in a high-crime area is not an 
objective indicium that one is involved in criminal 
activity,”  said the Court of Appeal. “As such, the 
arresting officer should not have considered this 
factor in determining his grounds for arrest. 
However, as indicated, based on the remaining 
grounds the arresting officer considered, his 
conclusion that he had reasonable  and probable 
grounds to arrest the [accused] was objectively 
reasonable.” It continued:
We do not accept that the arresting officer’s 
reliance on the fact that the apparent 
transaction occurred on the Proudfoot Lane 
apartment complex constituted discrimination 
based on “perce ived c lass” , thereby 
contaminating and undermining the arresting 
officer’s subjective grounds. The arresting 
officer found relevance in his knowledge that 
the Proudfoot Lane apartment complex was a 
high-crime area, not that it was a low-income 
area. He mentioned the low rents in the 
buildings when explaining why it is common 
for the apartments to be used as drug “stash 
houses”. We see no indication that he relied on 
the alleged poverty of the neighbourhood as an 
indicium of criminal activity.
Had the arresting officer done so, or had he 
expressed suspicion of criminal activity 
because the area was low-income, closer 
consideration of the [accused’s] submission on 
this point may have been warranted. That 
submission, by analogy to this court’s racial-
profiling decision in R. v. Dudhi, 2019 ONCA 
665,... is that reliance on discriminatory 
stereotypes about poverty and crime should be 
treated as tainting, and therefore undermining, 
an officer’s subjective grounds for interfering 
with the liberty of a suspect. In the 
circumstances of this appeal, however, we need 
not address this matter. [paras. 24-25]
Neutral Behaviours
The Court of Appeal found the trial judge was 
entitled to accept the testimony of the experienced 
drug officers in believing that the  series of events, 
viewed cumulatively, was consistent with a drug 
trafficking transaction. The relevant series of events 
included: 
• The conduct of the driver upon arrival; 
• The pickup of the accused on a public road 
rather than out front of the building he came 
from; 
• The otherwise pointless movement of the 
vehicle to a secluded area after the pickup;
• The apparent hand-off of something within the 
vehicle from the accused, who was carrying  a 
backpack; and 
• The short duration of the meeting. 
These  cumulative  behaviours, coupled with the 
smell of marijuana coming from the accused 
immediately after departing  the vehicle, provided 
the necessary reasonable grounds for the arrest and 
search. 
 Odour of Marijuana
The trial judge did not err in accepting the arresting 
officer’s testimony that he had smelled marijuana 
coming from the accused and his backpack before 
he made the arrest. The trial judge considered and 
rejected the accused’s challenge that it was 
implausible for the  arresting officer to smell 
wrapped marijuana inside a backpack. And the trial 
judge was not “obliged to demonstrate in his 
reasons that he had considered that smell evidence 
can be highly subjective and suspect.” There  was 
not a case-specific  reason to doubt the officer’s 
smell evidence. Nor did the trial judge engage in 
circular reasoning. When the trial judge said the 
arresting officer must have smelled marijuana or 
else he could not have arrested the accused, he  was 
simply   rejecting the suggestion that the  arresting 
officer had not smelled the marijuana until he had 
already arrested and detained the accused. Rather, 
when the arresting officer called the accused over, 
he secured the grounds for the accused’s arrest – 
the smell – before arresting him.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
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FAIRNESS REQUIRES SUED 
OFFICER TO CHALLENGE 
ADVERSE FINDINGS IN 
CRIMINAL TRIAL
Klassen v. British Columbia (Minister of 
Public Safety and Solicitor General), 
2021 BCCA 294
 
The plaintiffs (husband and wife) 
were charged with assaulting a police 
officer who had attended their 
residence in response to a dropped 
911 call. The officer alleged he 
witnessed the wife  lunge at and push her husband. 
When the officer arrested the wife, she assaulted 
the officer and her husband threatened him. The 
wife denied lunging at and pushing her husband.
At their criminal trial in British Columbia Provincial 
Court, the judge found it was not probable that the 
wife assaulted her husband and he rejected the 
officer’s evidence  on this point. The officer 
therefore did not have the necessary grounds to 
arrest the wife  and exceeded his authority in the 
melee that followed. Thus, the officer was not in the 
lawful execution of his duty when he attempted the 
arrest. Furthermore, the husband was justified in 
aiding his wife. The plaintiffs were acquitted of 
assaulting a peace officer. An appeal by the Crown 
from the verdict of acquittal was dismissed in the 
British Columbia Supreme Court.
British Columbia Supreme Court
The plaintiffs then sued the Province of 
British Columbia and the officer 
alleging  they were  both unlawfully 
arrested. They sought damages for the 
torts of assault, battery and false imprisonment. 
They also claimed that police intentionally inflicted 
emotional distress on them during and after their 
arrest by holding them overnight in cells, 
forwarding charges to the Crown for approval, and 
lying at trial. They sought damages for breach of 
their Charter  rights, and wanted aggravated and 
punitive damages. 
The defendants plead the officer had reasonable 
grounds to believe the wife had committed an 
assault and the husband had obstructed the officer 
in his duties. Thus, as was asserted at the criminal 
trial, it was claimed the officer had the grounds for 
an arrest and was justified in arresting the plaintiffs 
without a warrant. The defendants denied the use of 
excessive force and submitted, under s. 21 of the 
Police  Act, the officer was immune from personal 
liability  because he was acting in the performance 
of his duty and in the exercise of his powers as a 
provincial constable.
The plaintiffs sought the paragraphs in the 
defendants’ response to the lawsuit, claiming the 
arrest was lawful, be struck. In the plaintiffs’ view, 
since the arrest had already been found unlawful in 
the criminal trial, the doctrines of issue estoppel 
and abuse of process prevented the defendants 
from claiming this defence in the civil proceeding.
Even assuming that issue estoppel applied, the 
chambers judge exercised his discretion in not 
applying it and dismissed the plaintiffs’ application 
out of fairness to the officer. He noted that the 
plaintiffs had a number of protections in the 
criminal proceedings that they no longer would 
have in the civil proceeding. For example, in the 
criminal proceeding the plaintiffs had the right to 
remain silent, which the husband did exercise. But 
in the civil proceeding, the officer would have 




“Issue estoppel is concerned not with 
whether the cause of action in two 
proceedings is the same, but with 
whether an issue to be decided in 
proving the current action is the same as 
an issue decided in a previous 
proceeding. The causes of action may be 
(and typically are) different. Issue estoppel in Canada has 
historically applied to both civil and criminal law.” - R. v. 
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British Columbia Court of Appeal
The plaintiffs argued that the 
chambers judge erred in not 
applying the correct legal test 
for the exercise  of discretion 
related to both issue estoppel and abuse of process, 
and when exercising his discretion he used 
speculative concerns and conjecture.
Issue Estoppel?
Issue estoppel precludes an unsuccessful party from 
relitigating in the courts what has already been 
decided. In this case, since the arrest was already 
found to be unlawful in the criminal proceeding, 
the plaintiffs suggested the defendants were 
precluded from arguing its lawfulness in the civil 
proceeding. 
To establish issue estoppel, three preconditions 
must be met:
1. the same question has been decided;
2. the judicial decision which is said to 
create the estoppel was final; and,
3. the parties to the judicial decision or 
their privies were the same persons as 
the parties to the proceedings in which 
the estoppel is raised or their privies.
 
Even if these three requirements of issue estoppel 
have been met, the court retains the discretion to 
refuse to apply it if doing so would be unfair or 
work an injustice.
Although the judge declined to decide whether the 
three  preconditions of issue estoppel were met and 
moved directly  to exercising  his discretion, Justice 
Griffin, delivering the Court of Appeal’s decision, 
found the third precondition had not been satisfied:
Indeed, in my view the [plaintiffs] clearly failed 
to establish the third element of issue estoppel, 
namely mutuality of interests ... .
[The officer] was not a party to the criminal 
proceeding; he was a witness. The Crown did 
not represent his personal interests in that 
proceeding and did not stand in his place. [The 
officer] may well have disagreed with the 
Crown’s approach to the calling of evidence, 
c ross-examina t ion o f wi tnesses , and 
submissions. However, he was powerless to 
affect those things due to the independent role 
of the Crown prosecutor. [The officer] had no 
right to call witnesses or make submissions on 
his own behalf at the criminal trial.
The law is wel l-establ ished that the 
prosecutorial role of Crown counsel is a 
distinct, independent role. The Crown 
prosecutor does not represent the government 
as a whole, government employees or agents at 
large, victims, or the police. The Crown 
prosecutor must act solely in the public 
interest. It would be improper for a Crown 
prosecutor to advance the personal interests of 
a police officer in a proceeding. For these 
reasons, the third element of issue estoppel, a 
mutuality of interests, does not exist between 
the Crown prosecutor and other government 
actors in other roles, such as the police. 
[references omitted, paras. 29-31]
And further:
The separation of the Crown prosecutorial role 
and the police investigational role are essential 
to prevent miscarriages of justice. If Crown 
prosecutors had to consider the risk of civil 
liability due to reputational harm to police 
officers, it would undermine and conflict with 
their duties to protect the integrity of the 
process and the rights of the accused. For these 
reasons, prosecutors are not accountable to the 
police, whose interests are adverse to the 
accused.
[The officer] is therefore independent of the 
Crown prosecutor in the criminal trial. So too is 
the Minister, who is named in the civil lawsuit 
as vicariously liable under the Police Act for the 
damages allegedly caused by the actions of the 
police. Issue estoppel does not apply to these 
parties in this circumstance. [references 
omitted, paras. 34-35]
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Fairness?
Because issue estoppel did not arise, it was 
unnecessary to determine  whether the chambers 
judge properly exercised his discretion in not 
applying it on the basis of it being unfair to the 
officer. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal did 
comment on the issue. Although finality to 
litigation is a compelling  consideration, it is not 
solely determinative:
A number of procedural, evidentiary, and 
Charter safeguards exist to protect the rights of 
the accused in criminal proceedings, in 
furtherance of the principle of innocence until 
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Because of the procedural protections afforded 
to an accused in criminal proceedings, and 
because the case was not being advanced 
against him, [the officer] may not have had the 
opportunity to “put his best foot forward” in the 
criminal proceeding on issues relevant to the 
civil proceeding against him personally.
Further, the burden in the civil proceeding 
shifts and falls on the [plaintiffs] to prove their 
claim on a balance of probabilities. The 
[defendants] are entitled to discovery and have 
the right to subpoena the [plaintiffs] to testify. A 
judge in the civil proceeding will be required to 
weigh all the evidence on the civil standard of 
proof, a balance of probabilities, and could 
well come to a different conclusion about the 
facts of what happened during the altercation.
The [plaintiffs] submit that it is pure conjecture 
that the evidence obtained on discovery, or 
from [the husband], who did not testify in the 
criminal trial, would make any difference to the 
outcome. I do not find that submission helpful. 
It is always conjecture as to how the evidence 
at trial will unfold, as the witnesses are subject 
to cross-examination. The facts of what 
happened during the incident were witnessed 
by three people, and [the officer] has never had 
the opportunity to test the evidence of the 
[plaintiffs], and, if it turns out to be the case, to 
point out inconsistencies in the evidence of 
[the husband] and [the wife]. In my view it 
would be procedurally unfair to deny him the 
opportunity to defend himself by testing their 
evidence.
The [plaintiffs] submit that allowing the 
[defendants] to contest the lawfulness of the 
arrest would violate fundamental principles of 
justice underlying the community’s sense of fair 
play and decency. I disagree. A reasonable 
member of the public, properly informed, 
would not be offended by allowing [the officer] 
the opportunity to defend the allegations 
against him given the prospect of civil liability. 
Allowing the [defendants] to defend the civil 
c la im would not undermine the fa i r 
administration of justice. Indeed, the opposite 
is true: it would offend the community’s sense 
of fair play and decency to not allow [the 
officer] an opportunity to defend himself. 
[paras. 40-43]
Justice Griffin, citing the dissent in Ontario 
(Attorney General) v. Clark, 2021  SCC  18, 
reasoned that “a police officer witness tainted with 
adverse findings in a criminal trial has the  right to 
challenge those findings in a  subsequent civil 
lawsuit brought against the  officer, and, indeed, 
that fairness dictates that the officer be able to do 
so. Further, it is open to the  trial court in the civil 
lawsuit to make findings that are  exculpatory of 
the police officer, contrary to the  adverse findings 
in the criminal case.”
On my reading of the judge’s reasons, he 
quickly and succinctly homed in on the heart 
of this case: the unfairness of not allowing [the 
officer] to challenge the allegations regarding 
his conduct despite the fact he now faces 
significant jeopardy for civil liability and in 
light of the fact that his interests were not 
represented and he had no right to challenge 
the findings made at the criminal trial. I agree 
with the judge that it would be “fundamentally 
unfair” not to allow [the officer] to defend 
himself in the civil trial, given that the very 
restrictions he faced in defending his actions at 
the criminal trial were designed to protect the 
interests of the [plaintiffs] as accused persons. 
[para. 48]
The doctrine of issue estoppel did not apply in this 
case  nor was it an abuse of process to allow the 
police to defend all aspects of the claims against 
them. The plaintiffs’ appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at ww.courts.gov.bc.ca
Volume 21 Issue 4~July/August 2021
PAGE 45
IMMEDIATE ROADSIDE 
PROHIBITION SCHEME CAN 
SUSPEND CHARTER s. 10(b) 
R.B. v. British Columbia (Superintendent 
of Motor Vehicles), 
2021 BCCA 262
Police officers responded to a report 
of an alleged stalking, threats and use 
of a firearm incident. A suspect 
vehicle description was provided 
along with a  partial licence  plate 
number. Police spotted a vehicle  matching the 
description and stopped it at 6:36 p.m. The driver 
was arrested for the stalking allegations and he was 
handcuf fed . A f te r check ing the dr ive r ’s 
identification, it was determined he was not the 
suspect police were looking for. However, an 
officer smelled a strong odour of liquor on the 
driver’s breath and requested an approved 
screening device (ASD) be brought to the stop.
Within one minute, another officer arrived with an 
ASD. This officer approached the driver who was 
standing outside of his vehicle still in handcuffs. He 
had been asking to speak to his lawyer. The officer 
smelled liquor on the driver’s breath and, in 
response to police questioning, the driver admitted 
to consuming three  beers and said his last drink 
was at 6:20  p.m. The officer demanded a breath 
sample but the driver refused to provide one and 
continued to ask to speak to his lawyer. He also 
requested that the police allow him an opportunity 
to provide a blood sample.
Police explained the consequences of refusing to 
blow into the ASD (the seizure of his driver’s 
licence and service of a notice of driving 
prohibition). He was also advised that (1) his right 
to counsel under the Charter  was suspended for the 
purpose of obtaining the breath sample, (2) he was 
lawfully required to provide a sample, and (3) his 
request to go to the police station for an 
“evidentiary  blood test” was not an option. The 
driver maintained his refusal and he was issued a 
90-day immediate roadside prohibition (IRP) at 
6:43 p.m.
Superintendent of Motor Vehicles
The driver challenged the IRP before a 
delegate of the Superintendent of Motor 
Vehicles. He submitted that (1) he did 
not refuse or fail to comply with the 
demand and (2) he had a reasonable excuse  for not 
complying. He said he had repeatedly asked to 
speak to a lawyer after being arrested for the 
stalking allegations. And, since the police failed in 
their obligation to facilitate access to legal 
counsel , they could not lawfully obtain a sample 
from him. The Adjudicator determined that the 
driver refused to comply with the demand and, 
although his requests to speak to his lawyer were 
denied, his right to counsel was suspended at the 
time of the breath demand. The police did not 
breach the driver’s right to counsel when they 
denied him access to a  lawyer and, therefore, he 
did not have a reasonable excuse to refuse the  ASD 
demand. The IRP was confirmed. 
British Columbia Supreme Court
The driver (now petitioner) sought 
judicial review of the Adjudicator’s 
decision. He wanted the  IRP revoked 
because  he had a reasonable excuse for 
not complying with the ASD demand. He 
contended that when the demand for a breath 
sample was made, he was under arrest and in 
handcuffs on matters unrelated to the demand for a 
breath sample. This arrest triggered his rights under 
s.  10(b) of the Charter which could not be 
suspended for the purpose  of obtaining a breath 
sample. And because  he invoked his right to 
counsel under s. 10(b), he  had a reasonable  excuse 
for not complying with the ASD demand.
After reviewing the statutory framework for IRPs, 
the judge concluded, among other things, that the 
IRP scheme can suspend (or limit) the right to 
counsel. The judge also found it was reasonable for 
the Adjudicator to hold that the driver’s s.  10(b) 
right had been suspended. Moreover, the 
petitioner’s s. 10(b) rights had been minimally 
impaired and he had no reasonable excuse for not 
complying with the ASD demand. The IRP was 
again upheld.  
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British Columbia Court of Appeal
The petitioner asserted that the 
judge erred in not finding the 
adjudicator’s s. 10(b) Charter 
analysis unreasonable. He 
argued that he was not stopped by police for the 
purposes of roadside screening  and therefore the 
limit on his s. 10(b) right did not apply. He 
maintained that not having access to a lawyer 
excused his non-compliance with the breath 
demand. In other words, the petitioner relied on a 
deprivation of his right to counsel as his excuse for 
not blowing into the ASD.
Right to Counsel
Justice DeWitt-Van Oosten, authoring the 
unanimous Court of Appeal opinion, ruled it was 
reasonable for the Adjudicator to find that the 
petitioner’s s. 10(b) right was not breached when he 
was not permitted to contact counsel before being 
required to provide the breath sample into the ASD 
at roadside:
Here, the Adjudicator found that within one 
minute of the start of their interaction with [the 
petitioner], the police shifted their investigation 
from the Stalking Allegations to drinking and 
driving. After discovering that [the petitioner] 
was not the individual they were looking for, 
the police effectively abandoned that 
investigation and took no further related steps. 
Instead, they immediately turned their attention 
to the odour of alcohol on [the petitioner’s] 
breath, continued to detain him for that 
purpose, and made an ASD demand that the 
Adjudicator found met the requirements of 
s. 320.27 of the Code.
I am of the view that in these circumstances, 
the s. 10(b) limit upheld in [Gregory v. British 
Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 
2018 BCCA 7] did apply. Gregory affirmed that 
the police are not obliged for the purposes of 
an ASD demand within the context of the IRP 
regime to comply with the informational and 
implementation duties mandated by the right to 
counsel. They are not constitutionally required 
to facilitate access to legal counsel before 
obtaining a breath sample or before recording a 
refusal to comply with an ASD demand.
Gregory was binding on the Adjudicator and 
the judge. At law, [the petitioner] was not 
entitled to access a lawyer in relation to the 
demand that he provide a sample of his breath 
into an ASD. As such, the police were not 
obliged to wait until he did so before obtaining 
a sample. Moreover, in my view, it mattered not 
that prior to the ASD demand the police had 
arrested [the petitioner] for Code offences 
unrelated to drinking and driving. [paras. 
66-69]
And further:
... In my view, once [the Adjudicator] 
concluded that the breath demand met the 
requirements of s. 320.27 of the Code and was 
a valid ASD demand, the s.  10(b) enquiry in 
relation to that demand was complete. As a 
matter of law, [the petitioner] did not have the 
right to access a lawyer before blowing into the 
ASD or refusing to do so. It was not necessary 
to engage in an individualized assessment of 
whether the s.  10(b) limit upheld in Gregory 
was justified in [the petitioner’s] circumstances. 
[para. 77]
Since s. 10(b) was not operative  for purposes of an 
ASD demand, the  police refusal to facilitate the 
petitioner’s access to legal counsel could not, by 
itself, constitute a reasonable excuse for refusing to 
comply with a valid demand. The Adjudicator had 
reasonably determined that a deprivation of the 
right to counsel did not provide the petitioner with 
a reasonable excuse for non-compliance with the 
ASD demand. The petitioner’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“At law, [the petitioner] was not entitled to access a lawyer in relation to the 
demand that he provide a sample of his breath into an ASD. As such, the police 
were not obliged to wait until he did so before obtaining a sample.”
www.statcan.gc.ca
Source: Statistics Canada, General Social Survey, 2019.
• There is a clear link between adverse childhood experiences and negative outcomes
 in adulthood, including being a victim of violence.
• The 2019 General Social Survey on Victimization measured four types of childhood 
 maltreatment: physical abuse, sexual abuse, witnessing violence in the home, and 
 harsh parenting (e.g., emotional abuse, neglect). 
• These types of childhood maltreatment were each associated with a higher risk of 
 victimization in adulthood, even when controlling for other factors.
Harsh parenting was the most common form of childhood maltreatment, 
experienced by 6 in 10 Canadians before age 15.
All types of childhood maltreatment were linked to higher rates of violent 
victimization in adulthood. 
More than 9 in 10 (93%) people who experienced childhood physical or sexual abuse 
said that it was not reported to police, child protective services, or another agency. 




Most childhood abuse goes unreported.
Findings from the 2019 General Social Survey
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Did not experience Experienced at least once
Women who were abused as children were victimized 
at a rate 4 times higher than those who were not 
abused as children. For men, the rate was twice as 
high among those who were abused as children.
In 2019, women and men who were 
physically or sexually abused during childhood 
recorded higher violent victimization rates as 
adults, compared with those who were not. 
Link between childhood maltreatment and adult victimization was more 
pronounced for women.
CHILDHOOD MALTREATMENT 
and the link with victimization in adulthood: 
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